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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

GEORGIA v. MCCOLLUM ET AL.
            CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

No. 91-372. Argued February 26, 1992-Decided June 18, 1992

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, STEVENS, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ.,
joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a concurring opinion.  THOMAS,
J., filed an opinion  concurring in the judgment.  O'CONNOR, J.,
and SCALIA, J., filed dissenting opinions.


  JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

  For more than a century, this Court consistently and repeatedly
has reaffirmed that racial discrimination by the State in jury
selection offends the  Equal Protection  Clause. See,  e.g.,
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S.  303 (1880).  Last Term this
Court held that racial discrimination in a civil litigant's
exercise of peremptory challenges also violates the Equal
Protection Clause.  See Edmonson v. Leesville  Concrete Co., 500
U. S.  ___ (1991).   Today,  we are asked to decide  whether the
Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in
purposeful racial  discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
challenges.

I

  On  August 10, 1990, a grand jury sitting in Dougherty County,
Ga., returned a six-count indictment charging respondents with
aggravated assault and simple battery. See  App. 2. The
indictment alleged that respondents  beat and assaulted Jerry and
Myra Collins. Respondents are white; the alleged victims are
African-Americans. Shortly after the events, a leaflet was widely
distributed in the local African-American community reporting
the assault and urging community residents not to patronize
respondents' business.

  Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved to prohibit
respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner. The State explained that it expected to
show that the victims'race was a factor in the alleged assault.
According to the State, counsel for respondents had indicated a
clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially
discriminatory manner, arguing that the circumstances of their
case gave them the right to exclude African-American citizens
from participating as jurors in the trial. Observing that 43
percent of the county's population is African-American, the State
contended that,  if a statistically  representative panel is
assembled for jury selection, 18 of the potential 42 jurors would
be African-American. [1] With 20 peremptory challenges,
respondents therefore would be able to remove all the African-

American potential jurors. [2]  Relying on Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U. S.  79  (1986), the Sixth Amendment, and the Georgia
Constitution, the State sought an order providing that, if it
succeeded in making out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination by respondents, the latter would be required to
articulate a racially neutral explanation for peremptory
challenges.

  The trial judge denied the State's motion, holding that
"[n]either Georgia nor federal law prohibits criminal defendants
from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory
manner." App. 14. The issue was certified for immediate appeal.
Id., at 15 and 18.

  The Supreme Court of Georgia, by a 4-3 vote, affirmed the trial
court's  ruling.  State v. McCollum, 261  Ga. 473, 405 S.E.2d 688
(1991).  The court  acknowledged that  in Edmonson  v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U. S.___ (1991),  this Court had found that the
exercise of a peremptory challenge in a  racially discriminatory
manner "would constitute an impermissible injury" to the excluded
juror.  261 Ga., at  473; 405 S.E.2d, at 689.   The court noted,
however, that  Edmonson  involved private  civil litigants, not
criminal defendants. "Bearing in mind the long history of jury
trials as an essential element of the protection of human
rights," the court "decline[d] to diminish the  free exercise of
peremptory  strikes by a criminal defendant." Ibid. Three
justices  dissented, arguing that Edmonson and other decisions of
this Court establish that racially based peremptory challenges by
a criminal defendant violate the  Constitution.  261 Ga., at 473;
405 S.E.2d, at  689 (Hunt, J.); id.,  at 475; 405 S.E.2d, at 690
(Benham, J.); id.,c at 479; 405 S.E.2d, at 693 (Fletcher, J.).  A
motion for reconsideration was denied. App. 60.

  We granted certiorari to resolve a question left open by our
prior  cases--whether the Constitution prohibits a criminal
defendant from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination  in
the exercise of peremptory challenges. [3]  ___ U. S. ___ (1991).

  Over the last century, in an almost unbroken chain of
decisions, this Court gradually has abolished race as a
consideration for jury service. In Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303 (1880),  the Court invalidated a state statute
providing that only white men could serve as jurors. While
stating that a defendant has no right to a "petit jury composed
in whole or in part of persons of his own race," id., at 305, the
Court held that a defendant does have the right to be tried by a
jury whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory  criteria.
See also Neal v. Delaware, 103  U.S. 370, 397 (1881);  Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1935) (State cannot exclude
African-Americans from jury venire on false assumption that they,
as a group, are not qualified to serve as jurors).

  In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), the Court was
confronted with the question whether an African-American
defendant was denied equal protection by the State's exercise of
peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the
petit jury. Id., at 209-210. Although the Court rejected the
defendant's attempt to establish an equal protection claim
premised solely on the pattern of jury strikes in his own case,
it acknowledged that proof of systematic exclusion of African-
Americans through the use of peremptories over a  period of time
might establish such a violation.  Id., at 224-228.

  In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), the Court discarded
Swain's evidentiary formulation. The Batson Court held that a
defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in selection of the petit jury based solely on the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's
trial. Id., at 87. "Once the defendant makes a prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a
neutral explanation for challenging black jurors."  Id., at 97.4

  Last Term this Court  applied the Batson framework in two other
contexts. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. ___ (1991), it held that
in the trial of a white criminal defendant, a prosecutor is
prohibited from excluding African-American jurors on the basis of
race. In Edmonson v. Leesville  Concrete Co., 500 U. S.  ___
(1991), the Court decided that in a civil case, private litigants
cannot exercise their peremptory strikes in a racially
discriminatory manner. [5]

  In deciding whether the Constitution prohibits criminal
defendants from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges, we must answer four questions. First, whether a
criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges in a
racially discriminatory manner inflicts the harms addressed by
Batson. Second, whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by
a criminal defendant constitutes state action. Third, whether
prosecutors have standing to raise this constitutional challenge.
And fourth, whether the constitutional rights of a criminal
defendant nonetheless preclude the extension of our precedents to
this case.

III

                                A

  The majority in Powers recognized that "Batson `was designed
"to serve multiple  ends,"' only one of which was to protect
individual defendants from discrimination in  the selection of
jurors." 499 U. S., at ___  (sli